United States: The Achilles' heel of the Nixon administration and the EC-121incident handling

On April 15, 1969, the first reconnaissance squadron of the U.S. Naval AirForce, EC-121, took off from Atsugi Air Force Base in Japan, carrying 31 crewmembers and 6 Tons of equipment went to the waters of Japan to perform routinereconnaissance missions. At 11.50 pm EST, about 90 nautical milessoutheast of Chongqing, North Korea, the plane disappeared from the radarscreen. Hours later, North Korea claimed to have shot down an American spyplane trying to enter its airspace. Not long after, the United States confirmedthe news.

Earlier, on January 23, 1968, the US Navy intelligence reconnaissance ship"Pueblo" was besieged by North Korea, killing one person and injuringfour. The rest of the crew were captured. One year later, EC-121 wasshot down without survivors. These two crises pushed the Korean Peninsulato the brink of war. If the United States did not take any military actionafter the "Pueblo" crisis and was concerned about the safety of thehostages, it would be puzzling that the United States did not retaliate on alarge scale after the 121 incident in the European Community. Whatultimately caused the Nixon administration to abandon militaryoperations? What kind of discussions took place during the militaryoperation?

U.S. Army EC-121 reconnaissance aircraft

Nixon administration's initial response

On January 20, 1969, Nixon became the 37th President of the UnitedStates. He was ambitious, hoping to make a difference in the field ofdiplomacy, but in the fourth month of his term, he encountered "a majorcrisis in a region completely beyond the expectations of the Communistcamp". The president's first reaction was to respond to North Korea withviolence. . At the same time, analysis reports from various governmentdepartments swarmed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff drafted an article entitled"North Korean Motivation Investigation", listing "reachingreasonable compensation through diplomatic channels; using the samereconnaissance plane on the same battlefield to perform tasks; asking theSoviet Union to send representatives to North Korea; destroying NorthKorea" Coastal aircraft; blockade of North Korean ports. The report of theInformation Research Center focuses on the analysis of China, the Soviet Union,Japan, and South Korea's response to possible U.S. measures. It is concludedthat North Korea is unlikely to take any action unless it has the support ofthe Soviet Union and China. Action. The CIA outlined a more complete analysisof the situation in North Korea, saying "Kim Il Sung has always treatedthe United States with military hostility. He believes that smallcountries can also play an important role in the international communistmovement. At the same time, he hopes that this will dwarf Beijing and theSoviet Union. Especially after the Pueblo incident, North Korea'spropaganda theme was that a small, persevering country could defeat the GreatEmpire. "

On the evening of April 16, the National Security Council held its firstdiscussion on incident 121. Participants included President Nixon, VicePresident Agnew, Secretary of State William Rogers, Secretary of Defense Laird,Emergency Preparedness Director George Lincoln, Earl Wheeler, chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, Richard Helms, director of the Central IntelligenceAgency, and Kissinger, national security assistant. Wheeler listed the militarymethods available to the United States and their respective advantages anddisadvantages, such as attacks North Korean airports, blockade of North Koreansea ports, air strikes, launching ground attacks, etc. However, theconsequences of military retaliation are escalation of war. The United Stateshad no choice but to open a second battlefield outside Vietnam. Subsequently,Rogers proposed diplomacy to resolve the crisis Means, such as the PanmunjomDialogue and the UN platform condemning North Korea. In general, this seminarhas neither clear guidelines nor specific action plans, and is still in thetheoretical discussion stage. As a result, two kinds of emergence within thegovernment Opinion: A peace and basic diplomatic effort; one urges a strongattack on North Korea, but also in color Should.

The former represents Rogers, Laird and Helms. "Maybe we don't haveto move too fast and wait to see if it's better," Rogers said at a meetingof the National Security Council, and "seek diplomatic solutions fromfriends and allies." Laird's position is clearer. He inheritedthe easing relations between his predecessor Clifford and North Korea andopposed military strikes while dealing with the EC-121 crash. Kissinger concluded:"Rogers opposed (this war) because it would disrupt public opinion; Lairdopposed it because he thought it would hinder the Vietnam War and could not getthe support of Parliament

. Representatives of the Helms obje hawk include Kissinger, Kissinger'smilitary adviser Alexander Haig, and Vice President Agnew. Kissinger said,ironically in his autobiography: "Because we have no experience, we havenot even asked North Korea for compensation. By the end of April, after aperiod of noise, the crisis had subsided. From the perspective ofpunishing North Korea, there is no result. "However, after comparingthe EC-121 incident with the" Pueblo "crisis, Haig pointed out thatin the" Pueblo "incident, the president needs to consider theinterests of the captured crew. However, in dealing with EC-121 This fear didnot exist at the time of the crash, so some form of armed retaliation isnecessary. "If the president is reluctant to use his order to execute asignal about the use of weapons, I can suggest that we do not have to openlyattack the North Korean airport We can ambush on the ocean floor. "

Here, it is necessary to pay attention to President Nixon's attitude: the hawksbelieve that he is too weak, always hesitant to respond in a timely andeffective manner. The doves seem to think that he is tough and even considersusing nuclear bombs against North Korea. As for Nixon I, considering that hedid not start a new war when he took office, he finally gave up the option ofusing force. But he also said that if the other party did it again, he wouldnot be merciful. In private, they also rejected the "Dove" Rogers,Laird and Helms thought, and threatened to clear them as soon as possible.

Although senior government officials were unable to decide on a plan after theincident, Kissinger and Nixon understood that even if the United States had arange of military options, no one could guarantee an effective counterattackagainst North Korea and avoid escalating conflicts. It is diplomatic means orthe use of nuclear weapons to eliminate all North Korean air power." However, the nuclear strike was clearly too aggressive, and thereactions of China and the Soviet Union should be considered. Therefore,until the end of April 1969, the Nixon administration did not form a completeplan, except to protest at the United Nations and send aircraft carriers to theSea of